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Abstract—In this paper, we consider the achievable sum
secrecy rate in MISO (multiple-input-single-output) full-duplex
wiretap channel in the presence of a passive eavesdropper and
imperfect channel state information (CSI). We assume that the
users participating in full-duplex communication have multiple
transmit antennas, and that the users and the eavesdropper
have single receive antenna each. The users have individual
transmit power constraints. They also transmit jamming signals
to improve the secrecy rates. We obtain the achievable perfect
secrecy rate region by maximizing the worst case sum secrecy
rate. We also obtain the corresponding transmit covariance
matrices associated with the message signals and the jamming
signals. Numerical results that show the impact of imperfect
CSI on the achievable secrecy rate region are presented.
keywords: MISO, full-duplex, physical layer security, secrecy rate,
semidefinite programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Transmitting messages with perfect secrecy using physical
layer techniques was first studied in [1] on a physically
degraded discrete memoryless wiretap channel model. Later,
this work was extended to more general broadcast channel
in [2] and Gaussian channel in [3], respectively. Wireless
transmissions, being broadcast in nature, can be easily eaves-
dropped and hence require special attention to design modern
secure wireless networks. Secrecy rate and capacity of point-
to-point multi-antenna wiretap channels have been reported
in the literature by several authors, e.g., [4]–[7]. In the above
works, the transceiver operates in half-duplex mode, i.e.,
either it transmits or receives at any given time instant. On
the other hand, full-duplex operation gives the advantage of
simultaneous transmission and reception of messages [8].
But loopback self-interference and imperfect channel state
information (CSI) are limitations. Full-duplex communica-
tion without secrecy constraint has been investigated by many
authors, e.g., [9]–[12]. Full-duplex communication with se-
crecy constraint has been investigated in [13]–[15], where
the achievable secrecy rate region of two-way (i.e., full-
duplex) Gaussian and discrete memoryless wiretap channels
have been characterized. In the above works, CSI in all the
links are assumed to be perfect.
In this paper, we consider the achievable sum secrecy rate
in MISO full-duplex wiretap channel in the presence of a
passive eavesdropper and imperfect CSI. The users partici-
pating in full-duplex communication have multiple transmit
antennas, and single receive antenna each. The eavesdropper
is assumed to have single receive antenna. The norm of the
CSI errors in all the links are assumed to be bounded in
their respective absolute values. In addition to a message
signal, each user transmits a jamming signal in order to
improve the secrecy rates. The users operate under individual
power constraints. For this scenario, we obtain the achievable
perfect secrecy rate region by maximizing the worst case
sum secrecy rate. We also obtain the corresponding transmit
covariance matrices associated with the message signals and
the jamming signals. Numerical results that illustrate the
impact of imperfect CSI on the achievable secrecy rate
region are presented. We also minimize the total transmit
power (sum of the transmit powers of users 1 and 2) with
imperfect CSI subject to receive signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) constraints at the users and eavesdropper,
and individual transmit power constraints of the users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system
model is given in Sec. II. Secrecy rate for perfect CSI is
presented in Sec. III. Secrecy rate with imperfect CSI is
studied in Sec. IV. Results and discussions are presented in
Sec. V. Conclusions are presented in Sec. VI.
Notations : A ∈ CN1×N2 implies that A is a complex
matrix of dimension N1 × N2. A  0 and A ≻ 0 imply
that A is a positive semidefinite matrix and positive definite
matrix, respectively. Identity matrix is denoted by I . [.]∗
denotes complex conjugate transpose operation. E[.] denotes
expectation operator. ‖.‖ denotes 2-norm operator. Trace of
matrix A ∈ CN×N is denoted by Tr(A).
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider full-duplex communication between two users
S1 and S2 in the presence of an eavesdropper E. S1,
S2 are assumed to have M1 and M2 transmit antennas,
respectively, and single receive antenna each. E is a passive
eavesdropper and it has single receive antenna. The complex
channel gains on various links are as shown in Fig. 1, where
h11 ∈ C1×M1 , h12 ∈ C1×M2 , h21 ∈ C1×M1 , h22 ∈ C1×M2 ,
z1 ∈ C1×M1 , and z2 ∈ C1×M2 . S1 and S2 simultaneously
transmit messages W1 and W2, respectively, in n channel
uses. W1 and W2 are independent and equiprobable over
{1, 2, · · · , 2nR1} and {1, 2, · · · , 2nR2}, respectively. R1 and
R2 are the information rates (bits per channel use) associated
S2
E
h11
z1
h12
h22
(Φ1,Ψ1) (Φ2,Ψ2)
S1
z2
h21
Fig. 1. System model for MISO full-duplex communication. S1 has M1
transmit antennas and single receive antenna. S2 has M2 transmit antennas
and single receive antenna. E has single receive antenna.
with W1 and W2, respectively, which need to be transmitted
with perfect secrecy with respect to E [15]. S1 and S2
map W1 and W2 to codewords {x1i}ni=1
(
x1i ∈ C
M1×1
,
i.i.d. ∼ CN (0,Φ1), Φ1 = E[x1ix∗1i]
)
and {x2i}ni=1
(
x2i ∈
CM2×1, i.i.d. ∼ CN (0,Φ2), Φ2 = E[x2ix∗2i]
)
, respectively,
of length n. In order to degrade the eavesdropper channels
and improve the secrecy rates, both S1 and S2 inject jamming
signals {n1i}ni=1
(
n1i ∈ C
M1×1
, i.i.d. ∼ CN (0,Ψ1),
Ψ1 = E[n1in
∗
1i]
)
and {n2i}ni=1
(
n2i ∈ C
M2×1
, i.i.d.
∼ CN (0,Ψ2), Ψ2 = E[n2in
∗
2i]
)
, respectively, of length n.
S1 and S2 transmit the symbols x1i + n1i and x2i + n2i,
respectively, during the ith channel use, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hereafter,
we will denote the symbols in {x1i}ni=1, {x2i}ni=1 {n1i}ni=1,
and {n2i}ni=1 by x1, x2, n1, and n2, respectively. We
also assume that all the channel gains remain static over the
codeword transmit duration. Let P1 and P2 be the transmit
power budget for S1 and S2, respectively. This implies that
Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) ≤ P1, Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) ≤ P2. (1)
Let y1, y2, and yE denote the received signals at S1, S2 and
E, respectively. We have
y1 = h11(x1 + n1) + h12(x2 + n2) + η1, (2)
y2 = h21(x1 + n1) + h22(x2 + n2) + η2, (3)
yE = z1(x1 + n1) + z2(x2 + n2) + ηE , (4)
where η1, η2, and ηE are i.i.d. (∼ CN (0, N0)) receiver noise
terms.
III. SUM SECRECY RATE - PERFECT CSI
In this section, we assume perfect CSI in all the links.
Since S1 knows the transmitted symbol (x1 + n1), in order
to detect x2, S1 subtracts h11(x1 + n1) from the received
signal y1, i.e.,
y
′
1 = y1 − h11(x1 + n1)
= h12(x2 + n2) + η1. (5)
Similarly, since S2 knows the transmitted symbol (x2+n2),
to detect x1, S2 subtracts h22(x2 + n2) from the received
signal y2, i.e.,
y
′
2 = y2 − h22(x2 + n2)
= h21(x1 + n1) + η2. (6)
Using (5) and (6), we get the following information rates for
x1 and x2, respectively:
R
′
1
△
= I
(
x1; y
′
2
)
= log2
(
1 +
h21Φ1h
∗
21
N0 + h21Ψ1h
∗
21
)
, (7)
R
′
2
△
= I
(
x2; y
′
1
)
= log2
(
1 +
h12Φ2h
∗
12
N0 + h12Ψ2h
∗
12
)
. (8)
Using (4), we get the information leakage rate at E as
R
′
E
△
= I
(
x1,x2; yE
)
= log2
(
1 +
z1Φ1z
∗
1 + z2Φ2z
∗
2
N0 + z1Ψ1z∗1 + z2Ψ2z
∗
2
)
. (9)
Using (7), (8), and (9), we get the information capacities C ′1,
C
′
2, and C
′
E , respectively, as follows:
C
′
1 = log2
(
1 +
‖h21‖2 P1
N0
)
, (10)
C
′
2 = log2
(
1 +
‖h12‖2 P2
N0
)
, (11)
C
′
E = log2
(
1 +
‖z1‖2 P1+ ‖z2‖2 P2
N0
)
. (12)
A secrecy rate pair (R1, R2) which falls in the following
region is achievable [15]:
0 ≤ R1 ≤ R
′
1, 0 ≤ R2 ≤ R
′
2,
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ R
′
1 +R
′
2 −R
′
E ,
Φ1  0, Ψ1  0, Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) ≤ P1,
Φ2  0, Ψ2  0, Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) ≤ P2. (13)
We intend to maximize the sum secrecy rate subject to the
power constraint, i.e.,
max
Φ1, Ψ1,
Φ2, Ψ2
R
′
1 +R
′
2 −R
′
E (14)
= max
Φ1, Ψ1,
Φ2, Ψ2
{
log2
(
1 +
h21Φ1h
∗
21
N0 + h21Ψ1h
∗
21
)
+ log2
(
1 +
h12Φ2h
∗
12
N0 + h12Ψ2h
∗
12
)
− log2
(
1 +
z1Φ1z
∗
1 + z2Φ2z
∗
2
N0 + z1Ψ1z∗1 + z2Ψ2z
∗
2
)}
(15)
s.t. Φ1  0, Ψ1  0, Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) ≤ P1,
Φ2  0, Ψ2  0, Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) ≤ P2. (16)
This is a non-convex optimization problem, and we solve it
using two-dimensional search as follows.
Step1 : Divide the intervals [0, C ′1] and [0, C
′
2] in K and
L small intervals, respectively, of size △1 = C
′
1
K
and △2 =
C
′
2
L
where K and L are large integers. Let R′k1 = k△1 and
R
′l
2 = l△2, where k = 0, 1, 2, · · · ,K and l = 0, 1, 2, · · · , L.
Step2 : For a given (R′k1 , R
′l
2 ) pair, we minimize R
′
E as
follows:
R
′′kl
E
△
= min
Φ1, ψ1,
Φ2, ψ2
log2
(
1 +
z1Φ1z
∗
1 + z2Φ2z
∗
2
N0 + z1Ψ1z∗1 + z2Ψ2z
∗
2
)
(17)
s.t. R
′′k
1
△
= log2
(
1 +
h21Φ1h
∗
21
N0 + h21Ψ1h
∗
21
)
≥ R
′k
1 ,
R
′′l
2
△
= log2
(
1 +
h12Φ2h
∗
12
N0 + h12Ψ2h
∗
12
)
≥ R
′l
2 ,
Φ1  0, Ψ1  0, Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) ≤ P1,
Φ2  0, Ψ2  0, Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) ≤ P2. (18)
The maximum sum secrecy rate is given by
maxk=0,1,2,··· ,K,
l=0,1,2,··· ,L
(R
′′k
1 + R
′′l
2 − R
′′kl
E ). We solve the
optimization problem (17) as follows. Dropping the
logarithm in the objective function in (17), we rewrite the
optimization problem (17) in the following equivalent form:
min
t, Φ1, Ψ1, Φ2, Ψ2
t (19)
s.t.
(
z1Φ1z
∗
1 + z2Φ2z
∗
2
)
− t
(
N0 + z1Ψ1z
∗
1 + z2Ψ2z
∗
2
)
≤ 0,(
2R
′k
1 − 1
)(
N0 + h21Ψ1h
∗
21
)
−
(
h21Φ1h
∗
21
)
≤ 0,(
2R
′l
2 − 1
)(
N0 + h12Ψ2h
∗
12
)
−
(
h12Φ2h
∗
12
)
≤ 0,
Φ1  0, Ψ1  0, Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) ≤ P1,
Φ2  0, Ψ2  0, Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) ≤ P2. (20)
Using the KKT conditions of the above optimization problem,
we analyze the ranks of the optimum solutions Φ1, Ψ1, Φ2,
Ψ2 in the Appendix. Further, for a given t, the above prob-
lem is formulated as the following semidefinite feasibility
problem [19]:
find Φ1, Ψ1, Φ2, Ψ2 (21)
subject to the constraints in (20). The minimum value
of t, denoted by tklmin, can be obtained using bisec-
tion method [19] as follows. Let tklmin lie in the interval
[tlowerlimit, tupperlimit ]. The value of tlowerlimit can be
taken as 0 (corresponding to the minimum information
rate of 0) and tupperlimit can be taken as (2C
′
E − 1),
which corresponds to the information capacity of the eaves-
dropper link. Check the feasibility of (21) at tklmin =
(tlowerlimit + tupperlimit)/2. If feasible, then tupperlimit =
tklmin, else tlowerlimit = tklmin. Repeat this until tupperlimit−
tlowerlimit ≤ ζ, where ζ is a small positive number. Using
tklmin in (17), R
′′kl
E is given by
R
′′kl
E = log2(1 + t
kl
min). (22)
IV. SUM SECRECY RATE - IMPERFECT CSI
In this section, we assume that the available CSI in all the
links are imperfect [16]–[18], i.e.,
h11 = h
0
11 + e11, h12 = h
0
12 + e12, h21 = h
0
21 + e21,
h22 = h
0
22 + e22, z1 = z
0
1 + e1, z2 = z
0
2 + e2,
where h011, h
0
12, h
0
21, h
0
22, z
0
1, and z02 are the estimates of
h11, h12, h21, h22, z1, and z2, respectively, and e11, e12,
e21, e22, e1, and e2 are the corresponding errors. We assume
that the norm of the errors are bounded in their respective
absolute values as:
‖e11‖ ≤ ǫ11, ‖e12‖ ≤ ǫ12, ‖e21‖ ≤ ǫ21,
‖e22‖ ≤ ǫ22, ‖e1‖ ≤ ǫ1, ‖e2‖ ≤ ǫ2.
We make the following assumptions with respect to the
availability of the CSI at S1, S2, and E:
(a.) We assume that only the estimates h011, h021, z01, and
z
0
2 are available at S1 while h12 is perfectly known at S1
(coherent detection). Similarly, only the estimates h022, h012,
z
0
1, and z02 are available at S2 while h21 is perfectly known
at S2 (coherent detection). We assume that E has perfect
knowledge of z1, and z2 (coherent detection). With the above
error model, we rewrite (5), (6), and (4) as follows:
y
′
1 = y1 − h
0
11(x1 + n1)
= e11(x1 + n1) + h12(x2 + n2) + η1, (23)
y
′
2 = y2 − h
0
22(x2 + n2)
= h21(x1 + n1) + e22(x2 + n2) + η2, (24)
yE = z1(x1 + n1) + z2(x2 + n2) + ηE . (25)
(b.) We assume that while detecting x2, S1 treats the
residual term e11(x1 + n1) which appears in (23) as self-
noise. Similarly, while detecting x1, S2 treats the residual
term e22(x2 + n2) which appears in (24) as self-noise.
Further, in order to compute R′k1 , R
′l
2 , and R
′′kl
E , respec-
tively, as described in Step1 and Step2 in Section III, we get
the worst case capacities C ′1, C
′
2 for S1, S2 links, and best
case capacity C ′E for the eavesdropper link with imperfect
CSI as follows:
C
′
1 = log2
(
1 +
|‖h021‖ −ǫ21|
2
P1
N0
)
if
(
‖h021‖ > ǫ21
)
,
0 else. (26)
C
′
2 = log2
(
1 +
|‖h012‖ −ǫ12|
2
P2
N0
)
if
(
‖h012‖ > ǫ12
)
,
0 else. (27)
C
′
E = log2
(
1 +
|‖z01‖ +ǫ1|
2
P1 + |‖z
0
2‖ +ǫ2|
2
P2
N0
)
. (28)
Using (23), (24), and (25), we write the optimization problem
(17) with imperfect CSI as follows:
R
′′kl
E
△
= min
Φ1, Ψ1, Φ2, Ψ2
max
e1, e2
log
2
(
1 +
(z0
1
+ e1)Φ1(z
0
1
+ e1)
∗ + (z0
2
+ e2)Φ2(z
0
2
+ e2)
∗
N0 + (z01 + e1)Ψ1(z
0
1
+ e1)∗ + (z02 + e2)Ψ2(z
0
2
+ e2)∗
)
(29)
s.t. R
′′k
1
△
= min
e21, e22
log
2
(
1 +
(h0
21
+ e21)Φ1(h
0
21
+ e21)
∗
N0 + e22(Φ2 +Ψ2)e∗22 + (h
0
21
+ e21)Ψ1(h021 + e21)
∗
)
≥ R
′k
1
, (30)
R
′′l
2
△
= min
e11, e12
log
2
(
1 +
(h0
12
+ e12)Φ2(h
0
12
+ e12)
∗
N0 + e11(Φ1 +Ψ1)e∗11 + (h
0
12
+ e12)Ψ2(h012 + e12)
∗
)
≥ R
′l
2
, (31)
‖e11‖
2 ≤ ǫ2
11
, ‖e12‖
2 ≤ ǫ2
12
, ‖e21‖
2 ≤ ǫ2
21
,
‖e22‖
2
≤ ǫ
2
22
, ‖e1‖
2
≤ ǫ
2
1
, ‖e2‖
2
≤ ǫ
2
2
, (32)
Φ1  0, Ψ1  0, Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) ≤ P1,
Φ2  0, Ψ2  0, Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) ≤ P2. (33)
In the constraints (30) and (31), additional noise appear due
the terms e22(x2+n2) and e11(x1+n1), respectively, which
have been treated as self noise.
We solve the optimization problem (29) as follows. Drop-
ping the logarithm in the objective function in (29), we write
the optimization problem (29) in the following equivalent
form:
min
Φ1, Ψ1, Φ2, Ψ2
max
e1, e2(
(z01 + e1)Φ1(z
0
1 + e1)
∗ + (z02 + e2)Φ2(z
0
2 + e2)
∗
N0 + (z01 + e1)Ψ1(z
0
1
+ e1)∗ + (z02 + e2)Ψ2(z
0
2
+ e2)∗
)
(34)
s.t. min
e21, e22(
(h021 + e21)Φ1(h
0
21 + e21)
∗
N0 + e22(Φ2 +Ψ2)e∗22 + (h
0
21 + e21)Ψ1(h
0
21 + e21)∗
)
≥ (2R
′k
1 − 1), (35)
min
e11, e12(
(h012 + e12)Φ2(h
0
12 + e12)
∗
N0 + e11(Φ1 +Ψ1)e∗11 + (h
0
12 + e12)Ψ2(h
0
12 + e12)∗
)
≥ (2R
′l
2 − 1), (36)
‖e11‖
2 ≤ ǫ211, ‖e12‖
2 ≤ ǫ212, ‖e21‖
2 ≤ ǫ221,
‖e22‖
2 ≤ ǫ222, ‖e1‖
2 ≤ ǫ21, ‖e2‖
2 ≤ ǫ22,
Φ1  0, Ψ1  0, Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) ≤ P1,
Φ2  0, Ψ2  0, Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) ≤ P2. (37)
Solving the above optimization problem is hard due to the
presence of e1 and e2 in both the numerator and denom-
inator of the objective function in (34). Similarly, e21 and
e12 appear in both the numerator and denominator of the
constraints in (35) and (36), respectively. By independently
constraining the various quadratic terms appearing in the
objective function in (34) and the constraints (35) and (36),
we get the following upper bound for the above optimization
problem:
min
Φ1, Ψ1, Φ2, Ψ2
min
t1, t2,··· ,t10
( t1 + t2
N0 + t3 + t4
)
(38)
s.t. t3 ≥ 0, t4 ≥ 0, t5 ≥ 0, t8 ≥ 0, (39)
∀e1 s.t. ‖e1‖
2 ≤ ǫ21 =⇒
(z01 + e1)Φ1(z
0
1 + e1)
∗ − t1 ≤ 0, (40)
∀e1 s.t. ‖e1‖
2 ≤ ǫ21 =⇒
−(z01 + e1)Ψ1(z
0
1 + e1)
∗ + t3 ≤ 0, (41)
∀e2 s.t. ‖e2‖
2 ≤ ǫ22 =⇒
(z02 + e2)Φ2(z
0
2 + e2)
∗ − t2 ≤ 0, (42)
∀e2 s.t. ‖e2‖
2 ≤ ǫ22 =⇒
−(z02 + e2)Ψ2(z
0
2 + e2)
∗ + t4 ≤ 0, (43)( t5
N0 + t6 + t7
)
≥ (2R
′k
1 − 1), (44)
∀e21 s.t. ‖e21‖
2 ≤ ǫ221 =⇒
−(h021 + e21)Φ1(h
0
21 + e21)
∗ + t5 ≤ 0, (45)
∀e21 s.t. ‖e21‖
2 ≤ ǫ221 =⇒
(h021 + e21)Ψ1(h
0
21 + e21)
∗ − t7 ≤ 0, (46)
∀e22 s.t. ‖e22‖
2 ≤ ǫ222 =⇒
e22(Φ2 +Ψ2)e
∗
22 − t6 ≤ 0, (47)( t8
N0 + t9 + t10
)
≥ (2R
′l
2 − 1), (48)
∀e12 s.t. ‖e12‖
2 ≤ ǫ212 =⇒
−(h012 + e12)Φ2(h
0
12 + e12)
∗ + t8 ≤ 0, (49)
∀e12 s.t. ‖e12‖
2 ≤ ǫ212 =⇒
(h012 + e12)Ψ2(h
0
12 + e12)
∗ − t10 ≤ 0, (50)
∀e11 s.t. ‖e11‖
2 ≤ ǫ211 =⇒
e11(Φ1 +Ψ1)e
∗
11 − t9 ≤ 0, (51)
Φ1  0, Ψ1  0, Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) ≤ P1,
Φ2  0, Ψ2  0, Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) ≤ P2. (52)
We use the S-procedure to transform the pairs of quadratic
inequalities in (40), (41), (42), (43), (45), (46), (47), (49),
(50), and (51) to equivalent linear matrix inequalities (LMI)
[19]. With this, we get the following single minimization
form for the above optimization problem:
min
Φ1,Ψ1,Φ2,Ψ2,
t1,t2,··· ,t10,
λ1,λ2,··· ,λ10,
t
t (53)
s.t. t3 ≥ 0, t4 ≥ 0, t5 ≥ 0, t8 ≥ 0,(
t1 + t2
)
− t
(
N0 + t3 + t4
)
≤ 0,
(2R
′k
1 − 1)
(
N0 + t6 + t7
)
− t5 ≤ 0,
(2R
′l
2 − 1)
(
N0 + t9 + t10
)
− t8 ≤ 0,[
−Φ1 + λ1I −Φ1z0∗1
−z0
1
Φ
∗
1
−z0
1
Φ1z
0∗
1
+ t1 − λ1ǫ21
]
 0, λ1 ≥ 0,
[
Ψ1 + λ2I Ψ1z0∗1
z0
1
Ψ
∗
1
z0
1
Ψ1z
0∗
1
− t3 − λ2ǫ21
]
 0, λ2 ≥ 0,
[
−Φ2 + λ3I −Φ2z0∗2
−z0
2
Φ
∗
2
−z0
2
Φ
2
z
0∗
2
+ t2 − λ3ǫ22
]
 0, λ3 ≥ 0,
[
Ψ2 + λ4I Ψ2z0∗2
z
0
2
Ψ
∗
2
z
0
2
Ψ
2
z
0∗
2
− t4 − λ4ǫ22
]
 0, λ4 ≥ 0,
[
Φ1 + λ5I Φ1h
0∗
21
h
0
21
Φ
∗
1
h
0
21
Φ
1
h
0∗
21
− t5 − λ5ǫ221
]
 0, λ5 ≥ 0,
[
−Ψ1 + λ6I −Ψ1h
0∗
21
−h0
21
Ψ
∗
1
−h0
21
Ψ
1
h
0∗
21
+ t7 − λ6ǫ221
]
 0, λ6 ≥ 0,
[
−(Φ2 +Ψ2) + λ7I 0
0 t6 − λ7ǫ222
]
 0, λ7 ≥ 0,
[
Φ2 + λ8I Φ2h
0∗
12
h
0
12
Φ
∗
2
h
0
12
Φ
2
h
0∗
12
− t8 − λ8ǫ212
]
 0, λ8 ≥ 0,
[
−Ψ2 + λ9I −Ψ2h
0∗
12
−h0
12
Ψ
∗
2
−h0
12
Ψ
2
h
0∗
12
+ t10 − λ9ǫ212
]
 0, λ9 ≥ 0,
[
−(Φ1 +Ψ1) + λ10I 0
0 t9 − λ10ǫ211
]
 0, λ10 ≥ 0,
Φ1  0, Ψ1  0, Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) ≤ P1,
Φ2  0, Ψ2  0, Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) ≤ P2. (54)
For a given t, the above problem is formulated as the
following semidefinite feasibility problem [19]:
find Φ1, Ψ1, Φ2, Ψ2, t1, · · · , t10, λ1, · · · , λ10, (55)
subject to the constraints in (54). The minimum value of t,
denoted by tklmin, can be obtained using bisection method [19]
as described in Section III. The value of tlowerlimit can be
taken as 0 (corresponding to the minimum information rate
of 0). The value of tupperlimit can be taken as (2C
′
E − 1),
which corresponds to the best case information capacity of
the eavesdropper link. Using tklmin in (29), the upper bound
on R
′′kl
E is given by
R
′′kl
E ≤ log2
(
1 + tklmin
)
. (56)
Similarly, denoting the optimal values of t5, · · · , t10 by
tkl5 , · · · , t
kl
10, we obtain lower bounds on R
′′k
1 and R
′′l
2 as
R
′′k
1 ≥ log2
(
1 +
tkl5
N0 + tkl6 + t
kl
7
)
, (57)
R
′′l
2 ≥ log2
(
1 +
tkl8
N0 + tkl9 + t
kl
10
)
. (58)
Using the upper bound from (56) and lower bounds from (57)
and (58), the lower bound on the worst case sum secrecy rate
is given by maxk=0,1,2,··· ,K,
l=0,1,2,··· ,L
(R
′′k
1 +R
′′l
2 −R
′′kl
E ).
Remark: We note that when S1 and S2 do not transmit jam-
ming signals, the optimization problems (34) and (38) will be
equivalent, and the sum secrecy rate will be exact. However,
the lower bound on the sum secrecy rate as obtained above
with jamming strategies will always be greater than or equal
to the (exact) sum secrecy rate with no jamming strategies.
A. Transmit Power Minimization with SINR Constraints
In this subsection, we minimize the total transmit power
(i.e., S1 transmit power plus S2 transmit power) with imper-
fect CSI subject to receive SINR constraints at S1, S2, E,
and individual transmit power constraints. The optimization
problem to minimize the total transmit power is as follows:
min
Φ1, Ψ1, Φ2, Ψ2
Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) + Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) (59)
s.t. max
e1, e2(
(z0
1
+ e1)Φ1(z01 + e1)
∗ + (z0
2
+ e2)Φ2(z02 + e2)
∗
N0 + (z01 + e1)Ψ1(z
0
1
+ e1)∗ + (z02 + e2)Ψ2(z
0
2
+ e2)∗
)
≤ γE , (60)
min
e21, e22(
(h0
21
+ e21)Φ1(h
0
21
+ e21)∗
N0 + e22(Φ2 +Ψ2)e∗22 + (h
0
21
+ e21)Ψ1(h
0
21
+ e21)∗
)
≥ γS2 , (61)
min
e11, e12(
(h0
12
+ e12)Φ2(h
0
12
+ e12)∗
N0 + e11(Φ1 +Ψ1)e∗11 + (h
0
12
+ e12)Ψ2(h
0
12
+ e12)∗
)
≥ γS1 , (62)
‖e11‖
2 ≤ ǫ211, ‖e12‖
2 ≤ ǫ212, ‖e21‖
2 ≤ ǫ221,
‖e22‖
2 ≤ ǫ222, ‖e1‖
2 ≤ ǫ21, ‖e2‖
2 ≤ ǫ22,
Φ1  0, Ψ1  0, Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) ≤ P1,
Φ2  0, Ψ2  0, Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) ≤ P2. (63)
The left hand side of the inequality in the constraint (60) cor-
responds to the best case received SINR at the eavesdropper
over the region of CSI error uncertainty. Similarly, the left
hand side of the inequality in the constraints (61) and (62)
correspond to the worst case received SINR at S2, and S1,
respectively. γE , γS2 , and γS1 are known SINR thresholds at
E, S2, and S1, respectively. Solving the above optimization
problem is hard due to the presence of e1 and e2 in both
the numerator and denominator of the SINR expression of
the eavesdropper in (60). Similarly, e21 and e12 appear in
both the numerator and denominator of the SINR expressions
of S2 and S1 in the constraints (61) and (62), respectively.
By independently constraining the various quadratic terms
appearing in the constraints (60), (61), and (62), and further
using the S-procedure, we get the following upper bound for
the above optimization problem:
min
Φ1,Ψ1,Φ2,Ψ2,
t1,t2,··· ,t10,
λ1,λ2,··· ,λ10
Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) + Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) (64)
s.t. t3 ≥ 0, t4 ≥ 0, t5 ≥ 0, t8 ≥ 0,(
t1 + t2
)
− γE
(
N0 + t3 + t4
)
≤ 0,
γS2
(
N0 + t6 + t7
)
− t5 ≤ 0,
γS1
(
N0 + t9 + t10
)
− t8 ≤ 0,[
−Φ1 + λ1I −Φ1z0∗1
−z0
1
Φ
∗
1
−z0
1
Φ1z
0∗
1
+ t1 − λ1ǫ21
]
 0, λ1 ≥ 0,
[
Ψ1 + λ2I Ψ1z0∗1
z
0
1
Ψ
∗
1
z
0
1
Ψ1z
0∗
1
− t3 − λ2ǫ21
]
 0, λ2 ≥ 0,
[
−Φ2 + λ3I −Φ2z0∗2
−z0
2
Φ
∗
2
−z0
2
Φ
2
z
0∗
2
+ t2 − λ3ǫ22
]
 0, λ3 ≥ 0,
[
Ψ2 + λ4I Ψ2z0∗2
z0
2
Ψ
∗
2
z0
2
Ψ
2
z0∗
2
− t4 − λ4ǫ22
]
 0, λ4 ≥ 0,
[
Φ1 + λ5I Φ1h
0∗
21
h
0
21
Φ
∗
1
h
0
21
Φ
1
h
0∗
21
− t5 − λ5ǫ221
]
 0, λ5 ≥ 0,
[
−Ψ1 + λ6I −Ψ1h
0∗
21
−h0
21
Ψ
∗
1
−h0
21
Ψ
1
h
0∗
21
+ t7 − λ6ǫ221
]
 0, λ6 ≥ 0,
[
−(Φ2 +Ψ2) + λ7I 0
0 t6 − λ7ǫ222
]
 0, λ7 ≥ 0,
[
Φ2 + λ8I Φ2h
0∗
12
h
0
12
Φ
∗
2
h
0
12
Φ
2
h
0∗
12
− t8 − λ8ǫ212
]
 0, λ8 ≥ 0,
[
−Ψ2 + λ9I −Ψ2h
0∗
12
−h0
12
Ψ
∗
2
−h0
12
Ψ
2
h
0∗
12
+ t10 − λ9ǫ212
]
 0, λ9 ≥ 0,
[
−(Φ1 +Ψ1) + λ10I 0
0 t9 − λ10ǫ211
]
 0, λ10 ≥ 0,
Φ1  0, Ψ1  0, Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1) ≤ P1,
Φ2  0, Ψ2  0, Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2) ≤ P2, (65)
where t1, t2, · · · , t10 are as defined in the optimization
problem (38). The above problem can be easily solved using
semidefinite programming techniques.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present numerical results on the secrecy
rate under perfect and imperfect CSI conditions. We assume
that M1 = M2 = 2. We have used the following channel
gains as the estimates: h012 = [0.0838 + 0.5207i, 0.2226−
0.2482i], h021 = [0.4407+0.6653i, 0.5650− 0.0015i], z
0
1 =
[0.0765 + 0.0276i, −0.0093 + 0.0062i], z02 = [−0.0449 +
0.0314i, −0.0396−0.0672i]. We assume that the magnitudes
of the CSI errors in all the links are equal, i.e., ǫ11 = ǫ12 =
ǫ21 = ǫ22 = ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ. We also assume that N0 = 1.
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we plot the (R1, R2) region obtained
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Fig. 2. Achievable (R1, R2) region in full-duplex communication.
P1 = P2 = 3 dB, M1 = M2 = 2, N0 = 1, ǫ =
0.0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06.
by maximizing the sum secrecy rate for various values of
ǫ = 0.0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06. Results in Fig.
2 and Fig. 3 are generated for fixed powers P1 = P2 = 3 dB
and P1 = P2 = 6 dB, respectively. We observe that as the
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Fig. 3. Achievable (R1, R2) region in full-duplex communication.
P1 = P2 = 6 dB, M1 = M2 = 2, N0 = 1, ǫ =
0.0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.06.
magnitude of the CSI error increases the corresponding sum
secrecy rate decreases which results in the shrinking of the
achievable rate region. Also, as the power is increased from
3 dB to 6 dB, the achievable secrecy rate region increases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the sum secrecy rate and the corresponding
achievable secrecy rate region in MISO full-duplex wiretap
channel when the CSI in all the links were assumed to
be imperfect. We obtained the transmit covariance matrices
associated with the message signals and the jamming signals
which maximized the worst case sum secrecy rate. Numerical
results illustrated the impact of imperfect CSI on the achiev-
able secrecy rate region. We further note that transmit power
optimization subject to outage constraint in a slow fading
full-duplex MISO wiretap channel can be carried out using
the approximations by conic optimization in [20] as future
extension to this work.
APPENDIX A
In this appendix, we analyze the ranks of the solutions
Φ1, Ψ1, Φ2, and Ψ2 which are obtained by solving the
optimization problem (19) subject to the constraints in (20).
We take the Lagrangian of the objective function t subject to
the constraints in (20) as follows [19]:
ℓ(t,Φ1,Ψ1,Φ2,Ψ2, λ1, λ2,A1,B1,A2,B2, µ, ν1, ν2) =
t+ λ1
(
Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1)− P1
)
+ λ2
(
Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2)− P2
)
− Tr(A1Φ1)− Tr(B1Ψ1)− Tr(A2Φ2)−Tr(B2Ψ2)
+ µ
(
(z1Φ1z
∗
1 + z2Φ2z
∗
2)− t(N0 + z1Ψ1z
∗
1 + z2Ψ2z
∗
2)
)
+ ν1
((
2R
′k
1 − 1
)(
N0 + h21Ψ1h
∗
21
)
−
(
h21Φ1h
∗
21
))
+ ν2
((
2R
′l
2−1
)(
N0+ h12Ψ2h
∗
12
)
−
(
h12Φ2h
∗
12
))
, (66)
where λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, A1  0, B1  0, A2  0, B2  0,
µ ≥ 0, ν1 ≥ 0, and ν2 ≥ 0 are the Lagrangian multipliers.
The KKT conditions of (66) are as follows:
(a1) all the constraints in (20),
(a2) λ1 (Tr(Φ1 +Ψ1)− P1) = 0,
(a3) λ2 (Tr(Φ2 +Ψ2)− P2) = 0,
(a4) Tr(A1Φ1) = 0. Since A1  0 and Φ1  0 =⇒
A1Φ1 = 0,
(a5) Tr(B1Ψ1) = 0. Since B1  0 and Ψ1  0 =⇒
B1Ψ1 = 0,
(a6) Tr(A2Φ2) = 0. Since A2  0 and Φ2  0 =⇒
A2Φ2 = 0,
(a7) Tr(B2Ψ2) = 0. Since B2  0 and Ψ2  0 =⇒
B2Ψ2 = 0,
(a8) µ((z1Φ1z∗1+z2Φ2z∗2)− t(N0+z1Ψ1z∗1+z2Ψ2z∗2)) = 0,
(a9) ν1
((
2R
′k
1 − 1
)(
N0 +h21Ψ1h
∗
21
)
−
(
h21Φ1h
∗
21
))
= 0,
(a10) ν2((2R′l2 − 1)(N0 + h12Ψ2h∗12)− (h12Φ2h∗12)) = 0,
(a11) ∂ℓ
∂t
= 0 =⇒ µ
(
N0+z1Ψ1z
∗
1+z2Ψ2z
∗
2
)
= 1. This
implies that µ > 0,
(a12) ∂ℓ
∂Φ1
= 0 =⇒ A1 = λ1I+µz∗1z1−ν1h
∗
21h21  0,
(a13) ∂ℓ
∂Ψ1
= 0 =⇒ B1 = λ1I − µtz∗1z1 + ν1
(
2R
′k
1 −
1
)
h
∗
21h21  0,
(a14) ∂ℓ
∂Φ2
= 0 =⇒ A2 = λ2I+µz∗2z2−ν2h
∗
12h12  0,
(a15) ∂ℓ
∂Ψ2
= 0 =⇒ B2 = λ2I − µtz∗2z2 + ν2
(
2R
′l
2 −
1
)
h
∗
12h12  0.
We first consider the scenario when λ1 > 0. The KKT
condition (a12) implies that
A1 + ν1h
∗
21h21 = λ1I + µz
∗
1z1 ≻ 0. (67)
The above expression implies that rank(A1) ≥ M1 −
rank
(
ν1h
∗
21h21
)
. Since rank(ν1h∗21h21) ≤ 1, this further
implies that rank(A1) ≥ M1 − 1. Assuming Φ1 6= 0, the
KKT condition (a4) implies that rank(A1) = M1 − 1, and
the expression (67) implies that ν1 > 0. This means that
rank(Φ1) = 1. With λ1 > 0, and ν1 > 0, we rewrite the
KKT condition (a13) in the following form:
B1 + µtz
∗
1z1 = λ1I + ν1
(
2R
′k
1 − 1
)
h
∗
21h21 ≻ 0. (68)
If t > 0, the above expression implies that rank
(
B1
)
≥
M1 − rank
(
µtz∗1z1
)
= M1 − 1. The KKT condition (a5)
implies that rank
(
B1
)
= M1 − 1, and rank
(
Ψ1
)
= 1
(assuming Ψ1 6= 0). Now, if t = 0, the KKT condition
(a8) implies that z1Φ1z∗1 + z2Φ2z∗2 = 0, i.e., the received
signal power at the eavesdropper will be zero. The expression
(68), and the KKT condition (a5) further imply that Ψ1 = 0.
Also, when λ1 > 0, the KKT condition (a2) implies that
Tr(Φ1 + Ψ1) = P1, i.e., the entire power P1 is used for
the transmission. Similar rank analysis holds for Φ2 and Ψ2
when λ2 > 0.
We now consider the scenario when λ1 = 0. Assuming z1
and h21 are not collinear, the KKT condition (a12) will be
satisfied only when ν1 = 0. With this, the expression (67)
implies that A1 = µz∗1z1 and rank(A1) = rank(µz∗1z1) =
1. The KKT condition (a4) further implies that the eigen
vectors corresponding to the non-zero eigen values of Φ1
lie in the orthogonal complement subspace of z∗1, and
rank(Φ1) ≤ M1 − 1. Further, with λ1 = 0 and ν1 = 0,
the KKT condition (a13) will be satisfied only when t = 0
i.e., z1Φ1z∗1+z2Φ2z∗2 = 0. The above analysis implies that
there exist a rank-1 optimum Φ1. Similar rank analysis holds
for Φ2 and Ψ2 when λ2 = 0.
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